


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8 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

**SUBJECT: The President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board (PFIAB)**

PFIAB/NSC Review Completed.

1. The appearances before the PFIAB today seemed to me to go smoothly and to be well received. Messrs. FitzGerald and Karamessines presented a run-down of accomplishments in both the espionage and the covert action fields, with stress on the collection of intelligence on Soviet Russia (acquisition of the

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2. Dr. Gline devoted practically all of the one hour and a half at his disposal to the situation in North and South Vietnam, concluding with a very brief status report on the Dominican Republic.

3. Of particular importance were some remarks of Mr. Clifford concerning the President's interest in accurate intelligence. He introduced this statement by asking why, after 11 years, our intelligence coverage of North Vietnam was so limited. He also spoke disparagingly of intelligence coverage of Cuba prior to the Cuban missile crisis in October of 1962. Mr. FitzGerald responded (with support from Mr. Karamessines) with a very detailed description of the assets and operations aimed at the acquisition of intelligence in North Vietnam. This included a

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Mr. Fitz-

Gerald took rather sharp issue with the allegation concerning the inadequacy of intelligence coverage of Cuba prior to October 1962, and it would appear that the Board was inadequately informed on this subject.

4. Mr. Clifford stated predictably that the President would become increasingly impatient with intelligence which did not appear to be directly responsive to his immediate interests. He felt that both the Board and the Agency would come in for criticism to the extent that the President was unable to acquire specific responses to questions concerning the probable consequences of courses of action by the U.S. The President wants to know definitely what the North Vietnamese will do if we bomb Hanoi, etc.

5. As Mr. Clifford's assessment of the President's attitude is undoubtedly accurate, it seems to me of urgent importance that the Agency succeed in an educational process which makes it as clear as possible to those in authority and entitled to know:

a. The efforts which in fact are being made to acquire intelligence on difficult targets and proposals to improve these efforts; and

b. The fact that, despite our best efforts, certain information, such as the secret intentions of the small group of people who control North Vietnam, may never be available (1) because of the extreme difficulty of access to the people with the information, and (2) because these people themselves may not know which of a number of possible options they themselves will actually adopt.

6. It seems to me that this educational process should focus, initially at least, on the President's Board itself and that a concerted effort should be made to brief certain members of the Board, particularly Messrs. Clifford, Murphy and Land, with the details of what we are doing, what we have tried, and generally of the opportunities and obstacles to successful clandestine intelligence operations.

7. I made a point of stating that our objective, in appearances before the Board, was in no sense defensive but that we were there to explain activities and our problems and to seek advice and support.

JOHN A. BROSS
D/DCI/NIPE

cc: DDCI
DDP
ExDir-Comptroller
DDI